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Abstract—The Global Financial Crisis of 2008,
caused by the accumulation of excessive financial
risk, inspired Satoshi Nakamoto to create Bitcoin.
Now, more than ten years later, Decentralized Fi-
nance (DeFi), a peer-to-peer financial paradigm which
leverages blockchain-based smart contracts to ensure
its integrity and security, contains over 702m USD of
capital as of April 15th, 2020. As this ecosystem devel-
ops, it is at risk of the very sort of financial meltdown it
is supposed to be preventing. In this paper we explore
how design weaknesses and price fluctuations in DeFi
protocols could lead to a DeFi crisis. We focus on DeFi
lending protocols as they currently constitute most of
the DeFi ecosystem with a 76% market share by capital
as of April 15th, 2020.
First, we demonstrate the feasibility of attacking
Maker’s governance design to take full control of the
protocol, the largest DeFi protocol by market share,
which would have allowed the theft of 0.5bn USD of
collateral and the minting of an unlimited supply of
DAI tokens. In doing so, we present a novel strategy
utilizing so-called flash loans that would have in prin-
ciple allowed the execution of the governance attack in
just two transactions and without the need to lock any
assets. Approximately two weeks after we disclosed the
attack details, Maker modified the governance param-
eters mitigating the attack vectors. Second, we turn to
a central component of financial risk in DeFi lending
protocols. Inspired by stress-testing as performed by
central banks, we develop a stress-testing framework
for a stylized DeFi lending protocol, focusing our atten-
tion on the impact of a drying-up of liquidity on protocol
solvency. Based on our parameters, we find that with
sufficiently illiquidity a lending protocol with a total
debt of 400m USD could become undercollateralized
within 19 days.
Index Terms—Cryptocurrencies, decentralized fi-
nance, stress-testing, financial crisis, governance at-
tack, financial risk.
I. Introduction
Blockchain technology emerged as a response to the
Financial Crisis of 2007–8 [34].1 The perception that banks
had misbehaved resulted in a deterioration of trust in
the traditional financial sector [17]. The causes of the
crisis were several, but arguably chief among them was
a lack of transparency regarding the amount of risk major
banks were accumulating. When Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy, it had debts of 613bn USD, bond debt
of 155bn USD and assets of 639bn USD [8]. Central to its
bankruptcy was its exposure to subprime (i.e., bad quality)
1The first Bitcoin block famously outlines: “The Times
03/Jan/2009, Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks”.
mortgages. This exposure was compounded by the fact
that the bank had a leverage ratio2 of 30.7x in 2007 [9].
From their inception, blockchain-based cryptocurrencies
sought to provide a remedy to such crises: facilitating
financial transactions without reliance on trusted inter-
mediaries, shifting the power, and therefore, the abil-
ity to cause crisis through the construction of opaque
and complex financial instruments, away from banks and
financial institutions [34]. Ten years later, a complex
financial architecture—the architecture of Decentralized
Finance (DeFi)—is gradually emerging on top of existing
blockchain platforms. Components in this architecture in-
clude those that pertain to lending, decentralized exchange
of assets, and markets for derivatives (cf. Appendix A
Table I) [20], [19], [45], [48], [16], [23].
DeFi architectures for lending require agents to post
security deposits to fully compensate counter-parties for
the disappearance of the agent. We assume that when
an economically rational agent faces a choice between
the repayment of a debt or the loss of collateral, given
the absence of reputation tracking—on account of agent
pseudonymity and the possibility of an agent using mul-
tiple addresses—the agent will choose the least costly
option. Security deposits serve to guard against (i) mis-
behavior of agents, where the action that would maximize
individual utility does not maximize social welfare, and (ii)
external events, such as large exogenous drops in the value
of a particular cryptocurrency [21]. Of all DeFi protocols,
those with the most locked capital are for lending. As of
April 15th, 2020, the largest protocol by capitalization,
Maker [20], has c. 65% of all capital locked in DeFi,
corresponding to 342.9m USD [41].
Governance is another crucial facet of DeFi protocols
and we observe differing degrees of governance decentral-
ization. For example, Maker uses its own token (MKR) to
allow holders to vote on a contract that implements the
governance rules. In contrast, Compound [19], the third
largest protocol by market share, is centrally governed and
a single account can shut down the system in case of a
failure. Moreover, as in traditional finance, these protocols
do not exist in isolation. Assets that are created in Maker,
for example, can be used as collateral in other protocols
such as Compound, dYdX [16], or in liquidity pools on
Uniswap [48]. Indeed, the composability of DeFi — the
ability to build a complex, multi-component financial sys-
2Defined as total assets
equity
; the total assets were more than 30 times
larger than what shareholders owned, indicating substantial debt.
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tem on top of crypto-assets — is a defining property of
open finance [42]. However, if the underlying collateral
assets fail, all connected protocols will be affected as well:
there is the possibility of financial contagion.
This paper. We focus on DeFi lending protocols, which
constitute c. 76% of the DeFi market in capital terms. We
consider two distinct but interconnected aspects of the
attack and risk surface for collateral-based Defi lending
protocols: (i) attacks on the governance mechanism and
(ii) the economic security of such protocols in “black
swan” [46] financial scenarios.
In relation to attacks on the governance mechanism,
we examine an attack on Maker [20] which consists of an
adversary amassing enough capital to seize full control of
the funds within the protocol. Herein, we further consider
two distinct attack strategies. We engaged in a process of
responsible disclosure with Maker, which we detail, who
since modified their governance parameters to mitigate
the two attack strategies we present. The first attack
strategy, crowdfunding, inspired by [31], covertly executed,
was feasible within two blockchain blocks and required the
attacker to lock c. 27.5m USD of collateral. This would
have enabled an attacker to steal all 0.5bn USD of locked
collateral in the protocol and mint an unlimited supply
of DAI tokens. The second, novel, attack strategy utilized
so-called flash loans and allows an adversary to amass the
Maker collateral within a single transactions. This attack
did not require locking of collateral and only required a
few US dollars to pay for gas fees.
With respect to the economic security of collateralized
DeFi lending protocols, with reference to our stylized
model, we present the possibility of a DeFi lending proto-
col becoming undercollateralized (or insolvent) — where
security deposits become smaller than the issued debt —
as the result of a drying up of liquidity. Assuming ra-
tional economic agents, in such an under-collateralization
event, the borrower would default on their debts, since
the amount they have borrowed has become worth more
than the amount they escrowed. Starting from formal
definitions of the economic security constraints for DeFi
lending platforms, we then use Monte Carlo simulation
to stress-test their financial robustness. We submit that
such stress-testing constitutes an important approach to
bounding the economic security of DeFi lending protocols
when formal security proofs are not obtainable and their
security primarily depends on economic properties. We
find that for plausible parameter ranges, a DeFi lending
system could find itself undercollateralized. To the extent
that other DeFi protocols allow agents to lend or trade
the undercollateralized asset, financial contagion—where
an economic shock spreads to other protocols—would be
expected to result.
Contributions.
• Governance attack on Maker (Section III).
With specific focus on the largest DeFi project by
market share, Maker, we show how, prior to Maker
implementing a parameter change, it was feasible to
successfully steal the funds locked in the protocol
covertly and within two blocks or within two transac-
tions. By exploiting recent flash loan pool contracts,
we show how an attacker with no capital (besides
gas fees), would have been able to execute such an
attack, if the flash loan pools would provide sufficient
liquidity (which they did not at the time of writing).
• Formal modeling of DeFi lending proto-
cols (Section IV). We provide definitions for
economically-resilient DeFi lending protocols, intro-
ducing overcollateralization, liquidity, and counter-
party risk as formal constraints. These definitions
serve to formalize financial risk constraints for more
than 93% of the funds locked in DeFi lending proto-
cols as of April 15th, 2020 [41].
• Financial stress-testing (Section V). We develop
a methodology to quantitatively stress-test a DeFi
protocol with respect to its financial robustness, in-
spired by risk assessments performed by central banks
in traditional financial systems. We simulate a price
crash event with our stress-test methodology to a styl-
ized DeFi lending protocol that resembles the largest
DeFi lending protocols to-date, by volume: Maker,
Compound, Aave and dYdX. We find, for plausible
parameter ranges, that a DeFi lending protocol could
become undercollateralized within 19 days.
II. Overview of Decentralized Finance
This section provides a definition of DeFi, describes the
composability property of DeFi protocols, and states our
assumptions regarding the underlying blockchain.
DeFi is an emergent field, with over 702m USD of total
value locked in DeFi protocols as of April 15th, 2020 [41].
Table I in Appendix A presents a categorization of DeFi
protocols, providing the three largest by locked USD in
each case. We observe that Maker dominates the DeFi
projects with a capitalization of over 342.9m USD. DeFi
protocols mostly emerge for uses such as lending, de-
centralized exchange, and derivatives. We define DeFi as
follows.
Definition II.1 (Decentralized Finance (DeFi)). a peer-
to-peer financial system, which leverages distributed
ledger-based smart contracts to ensure its integrity and
security.
In this paper we make the assumption that agents are
rational, that is, are agents who seek to maximize their ex-
pected utility. We assume that agents are pseudonymous.
A. DeFi Composability
DeFi protocols do not exist in isolation. Their open
nature allows developers to create new protocols by com-
posing existing protocols together. Some compare this
approach with “Money Lego” [42]. As such, assets created
through lending in one protocol can be reused as collateral
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in other protocols in any kind of fashion. This creates
a complex and intertwined system of assets and debt
obligations. Moreover, a failure of a protocol that serves
as backing asset to other protocols has a cascading effect
on others. Indeed, a hallmark of financial crisis is that
such events do not take place in isolation, but rather
financial contagion takes place, where a shock affecting a
few institutions spreads by contagion to the the rest of the
financial sector, before affecting the larger economy [4].
B. Blockchain Model
A DeFi protocol operates on top of a layer-one
blockchain, which provides standard ledger functional-
ity [6], [5], [15], [38]. We assume that the underlying
blockchain is able to provide finality [11], [32], construed
as a guarantee that once committed to the blockchain a
transaction cannot be modified or reversed. For this paper,
we treat attacks on layer-one blockchains as orthogonal
and as such we are not concerned with them.3
III. Governance Attack on Maker
In this section, we first present an attack on the gov-
ernance mechanism of the Maker protocol [20]. We use a
representation of the state of the Ethereum main network
on February 7th and the Maker contract to simulate as
realistically as possible how such an attack could take
place. While focusing on a specific protocol, we submit
that such a governance attack is representative of a new
element of the attack surface for DeFi protocols more
generally. Since we first analyzed this attack vector, the
Maker protocol has been modified to mitigate this attack:
we detail our interaction with the Maker team below.
Although the basic idea of the attack had been briefly
presented in a blog post [31], the feasibility of the attack
has not been analyzed.
A. Disclosure to Maker
We engaged in a process of responsible disclosure with
Maker, as detailed below.
• On February 7th, 2020 we reached out to the Maker
team regarding our exposition of the feasibility of the
governance attack.
• On February 14th the authors had a conference call
with Maker, where we described our work. We agreed
to giving the Maker team sight of this paper prior to
our publication of it; we subsequently sent a draft of
the paper on February 17th.
• On February 18th the authors further contacted
Maker to describe how the use of flash loans increased
the risk of the governance attack, offering a response
window prior to publicizing this result within which
Maker provided helpful feedback.
3Future work could consider the possibility of combining layer-one
attacks with smart-contract attacks to increase their probability of
success. For example, see the successful attack on Fomo3D [44].
After this exchange, on February 21st Maker announced
that the Governance Security Module had been activated
with a delay period of 24 hours [29], mitigating the vul-
nerability.
B. Background and Threat Model
The governance process relies on the MKR token, where
participants have voting rights proportional to the amount
of MKR tokens they lock within the voting system. MKR
can be traded on exchanges [12].
Executive voting. Using executive voting, participants
can elect an executive contract, defining a set of rules to
govern the system, by staking (i.e., locking-up) tokens on
it. Executive voting is continuous, i.e., participants can
change their vote at any time and a contract can be newly
elected as soon as it obtains a majority of votes. The
elected contract is the only entity allowed to manipulate
funds locked as collateral. If a malicious contract were to
be elected, it could steal all the funds locked as collateral.
Defense mechanisms. Several defense mechanisms exist
to protect executive voting. The Governance Security
Module encapsulates the successfully elected contract for
a certain period of time, after which the elected contract
takes control of the system. At the time of first writing
on February 7th, this period was set to zero [50]. This
has subsequently been increased to 24 hours [28], see
Section III-A. The Emergency Shut Down, which allows
a set of participants holding a sufficient amount of MKR
to halt the system. However, this operation requires a
constant pool of 50k MKR tokens, worth 27.5M USD as
of February 7th.4
Threat model. We assume the existence of a rational ad-
versary i.e., one who would only engage in the attack if the
potential returns are higher than the costs. In this attack,
the costs are the amount of money that the adversary has
to pay to have his contract elected as executive contract.
The returns are the amount of money that the contract
could steal or generate once it is elected. There are two
ways in which electing an adversarial executive contract
can financially benefit the adversary. First, the contract
can transfer all the ETH collateral to the adversary’s
address. Second, the contract can mint new DAI tokens
and transfer them to the adversary. The DAI tokens can
then be traded until the DAI price crashes and effectively
destroy the Maker system.
As of February 7th there were c. 150k MKR tokens used
for executive voting and the current executive contract
had 76k MKR tokens staked. We observed that the staked
amount changes relatively often and the amount of tokens
staked on the elected contract often dropped below 50k
MKR tokens (eq. 27.5M USD). As of February 7th, there
were c. 470M USD worth of ETH locked as collateral of
the DAI supply, which an executive contract can dispose of
4We use the price of MKR on 2020-02-01, which was 550 USD.
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Fig. 1: Evolution of the amount of MKR tokens staked on
different executive candidate contracts. We observe that at
times the MKR amount of the executive contract dropped
below 50k MKR.
freely. This shows that even before trading the DAI tokens,
the attack would have been financially attractive.
C. Crowdfunding and Flash Loans
An adversary can choose between the two following
strategies to amass the capital required for the governance
attack.
Crowdfunding. Crowdfunding MKR tokens may allow
users to lock their tokens in a contract and program the
contract so that when the required amount of MKR tokens
is reached, it stakes all its funds on a malicious executive
contract. This would allow multiple parties to collaborate
trustlessly on such an attack, while keeping control of
their funds and while being assured that they will be
compensated for their participation in it. 5
Liquidity pools and flash loans. A shortcoming of
the crowdfunding attack is the required coordination ef-
fort between the participants and the likely alerting of
benevolent MKR members. Instead, an attack could use
liquidity pools offering flash loans [3]. A flash loan is a non-
collateralized loan that is valid within one transaction only.
In the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), a transaction
can be reverted entirely if a condition in one part of the
transaction is not fulfilled. A flash loan then operates as
follows: a party creates a smart contract that (i) takes out
the loan, (ii) executes some actions, and (iii) pays back
the loan and, depending on the platform, interest.
The interesting aspect for our purposes is that if in
step (ii) the execution of the actions fails or step (iii)
the repayment of the loan cannot be completed, the EVM
treats this loan as it never took place. Hence, under the
5An (admittedly informal) poll on Twitter from late 2019 con-
ducted by a user soon after this attack first appeared shows that
several participants would be interested in such crowdfunding. See
Fig. 6 in Appendix B.
assumption there is enough liquidity available in proto-
cols such as dYdX [16] and Aave [2], an attacker could
execute the MKR governance attack in step (ii), and, if
successful, repay the flash loan in step (iii). Since the flash
loan requires no collateral, the capital lock up cost for
the attacker is significantly reduced. If there is enough
liquidity available in these pools, the attacker might even
not have to lock any tokens. Furthermore, the liquidity
provider may have also profited from the execution of the
attack, depending on in which protocol their tokens were
locked. For example, in Aave as of February 7th they would
have received an interest rate of 0.09% for each flash loan.
D. Practical Attack Viability
In this section, we use empirical data to show how such
an attack could take place, and describe what the potential
shortcomings could be. We first analyze all the transac-
tions received by Maker’s governance contract of as Febru-
ary 7th: 0x9ef05f7f6deb616fd37ac3c959a2ddd25a54e4f5.
Since the deployment of this contract, in May 2019, there
were 24 different contracts which have been elected as
executive contract (cf. Fig. 1). When a contract is elected
as the executive contract, the total amount of staked MKR
is, for a short period of time, distributed almost equally
between the old and the new executive contract.6 This
serves to reduce the amount of tokens required for the
attack by more than 50%.
One day after the first blog on this attack was pub-
lished [31]), there was a sharp increase in the MKR
staked on the executive contract, rising from c. 75k to
c. 160k MKR at the beginning of December 2019. One
token holder [22] in particular injected a large quantity
of tokens—c. 66k MKR—potentially to help prevent an
attack from occurring. 7
E. The Attacks
The crowdfunding strategy. We inspected the amount
of MKR transferred between January 1st, 2020 and Febru-
ary 8th, 2020. 8 We find a mean MKR transaction volume
of c. 9k MKR tokens per day, corroborated by e.g. [12].
Given such volumes, an attacker accumulating 1k MKR
tokens per day, for instance, would have sufficient tokens in
less than 2 months. However, accumulating all the tokens
in a single account would likely attract attention. Indeed,
from our discussions with the Maker team, the large MKR
token holders seem to be known.
6This was particularly visible at the end of November 2019 (80k
MKR to 40k MKR) and in the middle of January 2020 (120k MKR
to 45k MKR).
7It is unclear if the token holder was the Maker Foundation or
some other party; in our discussion with Maker they stated they knew
the identity of the token holder. The holder staked their tokens on
the currently elected contract, making the attack more difficult to
execute, before releasing the staked tokens approximately one month
later. The token holder had more than sufficient tokens to execute
the attack: were they malicious, they could have stolen the funds.
8See Appendix B, Fig. 7.
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Fig. 2: Example flash loan attack against Maker. All steps can be executed within one transaction, under the assumption that
the flash loan pool and DEX have sufficient liquidity available. To execute the attack, the adversary would not need upfront
capital, besides the gas fees (estimated to amount to c. 15 USD).
To be covert, an attacker could try to accumulate tokens
to multiple accounts without perceptibly changing the
distribution of MKR tokens. On February 8th there were
c. 5k accounts, holding a total of c. 272k MKR tokens.9
Given that the attack is possible with 50k MKR tokens,
an adversary could spread their tokens across e.g. 100
accounts with an average of 500 tokens each. However, one
drawback of this approach is the requirement to vote from
these 100 accounts. Voting for a contract costs on aver-
age 69k gas. Given the gas limit per block on Ethereum is
10 million, filling half of a block with voting transactions
would allow votes from 10M/69k ≈ 72 contracts. Doing
so would be inexpensive [40], meaning that an attacker
would have been able to easily perform the whole attack in
two blocks. In the second block, the attacker would finish
voting for his malicious contract and execute the attack
from the contract, which would leave only one block for
anyone to react to the attack.
The flash loan strategy. Alternatively, to execute the
governance attack without amassing tokens, the attacker
could utilize liquidity pools to borrow the required tokens
via a flash loan (e.g. via dYdX [16] or Aave [3]). 10 The
attacker makes the following two transactions (cf. Fig. 2).
Transaction 1: Deploy the malicious governance con-
tract and deploy the attack contract executing the
flash loan.
Transaction 2: Call the attack contract deployed in
Transaction 1 that executes the following steps.
1) Take out flash loan(s)(e.g. from Aave and dYdX) in
the currency with the deepest markets for buying
MKR tokens. As of February 7th this was ETH.
2) Sell the ETH loan for 50k MKR tokens on decen-
tralized exchange(s).
3) Vote with the 50k MKR tokens to replace the cur-
rent Maker governance contract with the malicious
contract deployed in Transaction 1.
4) Mint DAI into an account chosen by the attacker.
5) Take out enough ETH from the Maker system to
repay the flash loan.
6) Repay the flash loan with the required 0.09% inter-
9Excluding the holders with a low balance (less than 1 MKR
token), and a large balance (more than 5k MKR tokens).
10Aave is a protocol deployed on the Ethereum mainnet on Jan-
uary 8th, 2020, https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4752f752f5262fb11733e0
136033f7d53cdc90971441750f606cf1594a5fde4f.
est to Aave and repay the flash loan to dYdX with
minimal (1 WEI) interest.
In a naive approach, we could utilize the exchange rate
for ETH to MKR to obtain that an attacker requires
114,746 ETH to execute the attack. However in practice,
an attacker seeking to buy such a large quantity of MKR
tokens would pay a greater price than this, forced to
buying the tokens at the best remaining market price for
each unit. As of February 14th, an attacker sourcing the
required 50k MKR tokens from three different DEXs—38k
MKR from Kyber, 11,500 MKR from Uniswap, and 500
MKR from Switcheo—would need a total of 378,940 ETH,
3.3x that of the naive estimate. 11 As of February 14th,
the flash loan providers had insufficient pool liquidity:
dYdX had c. 83,590 ETH and Aave had c. 13,670 ETH.
However, on February 14th the ETH growth rate of Aave
was 5.18% per day. Assuming the growth rate continued,
it would have only taken 66 days until enough liquidity
was available in Aave.
F. Profitability Analysis
The crowdfunding strategy. With the crowd funding
strategy, the profits from the attack could be split equally
between the funding parties. The only cost are the 20
USD for including the transactions [40]. In return, the
attackers could take away the 434,873 ETH in collateral in
Maker plus 145m DAI, amounting to a net profit of 263m
USD (as of February 7th). Additionally, the attackers
could mint unlimited new DAI and use this to buy other
cryptocurrencies available at centralized and decentralized
exchanges.
The flash loan strategy. Assuming dYdX’s and Aave’s
liquidity pools had accumulated the required 378,940 ETH
to execute the attack, we can calculate the profitability
as follows. The attacker obtains a total of 434,873 ETH
in collateral from Maker as well as the 50k MKR tokens
and the 22m DAI currently in circulation. The attacker
needs to repay the 378,940 ETH loan with minimal interest
(1 WEI for dYdX and 0.09% for Aave (265.82 ETH)).
Furthermore, the attacker needs to pay for the gas fees
for the two transactions. The second transaction involves
various function calls to other contracts and will cost c. 15
USD equivalent of gas. However, by the end of the attack,
11For current liquidity and rates see https://dexindex.io/.
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the attacker has c. 55k ETH, 50k MKR, and 145m DAI.
This amounts to a net profit of 191m USD. Moreover,
the attacker can design the attack smart contract such
that the transaction is reverted if it becomes unprofitable.
This makes the attack risk free from a cost perspective
for the attacker. As pointed out above, the attacker can
further create unlimited DAI to buy up existing liquidity
on decentralized and centralized exchanges.
IV. DeFi Lending Protocols
After having presented a specific attack vector, we now
turn to a generalization of the financial risk that exists
for DeFi lending protocols. This section provides a formal
system model for a DeFi lending system and characterizes
system constraints. Appendix C Table II details the pa-
rameters for existing DeFi lending protocols that we seek
to generalize in this section.
A. DeFi Lending Protocol Model
Overcollateralized borrowing allows an agent to provide
an asset A as collateral to receive or create another asset
B, of lower value, in return. The asset B, typically together
with the payment of a fee, can be returned and the agent
redeems its collateral in return. However, borrowed asset
B may have different properties to asset A: for example, an
agent might provide a highly volatile asset A and receive a
price-stable asset B in return. Furthermore, a third asset
C can serve as a governance mechanism, such as MKR.
Holders of asset C are able to influence the rules of the
DeFi lending protocol. In absence of a governance asset,
DeFi lending protocols typically replace this function with
a central privileged operator introducing counter-party
risk.
At the agent level, a DeFi lending protocol permits
agents k ∈ K to escrow units of cryptocurrency i, ci and
borrow (or issue) units of another cryptocurrency d against
that value. We formulate the constraints herein such that
i ∈ I, where I denotes all the permissible collateral types.
Appendix C Table II provides the collateral assets and
liquidation ratios for DeFi protocols that account for 93%
of the DeFi lending market. The prices of escrowed and
borrowed assets are typically quoted with reference to an
agreed quote currency, e.g. USD.
At the system level, a DeFi protocol is the aggregation
of the individual acts of borrowing by agents, such that
the system collateral of type i is given by Ci =
∑K
k=1 ci,k
for K agents. We formally define an economically secure
DeFi lending protocol as follows:
Definition IV.1 (Economically Secure DeFi lending pro-
tocol). Assuming rational agents, a DeFi lending protocol
is economically secure if it ensures that ∀t, with reference
to a basis of value (e.g. USD), the total value of the system
debt D at time t is smaller than the total value of all
backing collateral types I (
∑I
i=1 Ci) at time t.
B. Economic Security Constraints
We now provide three constraints on the economic se-
curity of a DeFi lending protocol. These constraints apply
to DeFi protocols which feature one or several collateral
assets and which may additionally feature a reserve asset.
The Overcollateralization Constraint. Since the val-
ues of both the collateral assets and debt are subject
to price fluctuations, overcollateralization seeks to ensure
that there is always sufficient collateral to cover debt, i.e.,
to avoid insolvency.
Definition IV.2 (Overcollateralization). When escrowed
collateral ci has a greater value with respect to a basis of
value than the issued loan d.
Denoting the overcollateralization factor as λi ≥ 0, such
that each collateral type has its own minimum collateral-
ization ratio, and the price and quantity of an asset as P ()
and Q() respectively, the margin M of overcollateralization
at time t at the system level12 is as follows (summing over
agents k ∈ K and collateral types i ∈ I). A protocol
designer faces a trade-off. If the parameter λi is too low,
volatile markets may mean that the protocol becomes
undercollateralized. However, if it is too high, then there
is significant capital market inefficiency, with more capital
than necessary in escrow, leading to opportunity costs of
capital.
Mt = (1 + λi)
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
Pci,k,tQci,k,t −
K∑
k=1
dk,t (1)
Clearly, Mt ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
∑K
k=1 dk,t ≤ (1 +
λi)
∑K
k=1
∑I
i=1 Pci,k,tQci,k,t . Should M < 0, then the
margin of overcollateralization is negative and therefore
the system as a whole is undercollateralized.
In addition, a protocol may have another pool of reserve
liquidity available, enabling it to act as a lender of last
resort.13 For example, one such pool of collateral could
be constituted by governance tokens Π for the protocol
itself.14 In a DeFi protocol, participants can have voting
power in proportion to the number of governance tokens
they hold. The total value of this pool of collateral is given
by P (Π)Q(Π), and thus adding this into the margin of
overcollateralization for the system yields:
Mt = (1+λi)
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
Pci,k,tQci,k,t+PΠ,tQΠ,t−
K∑
k=1
dk,t (2)
Therefore, at the system level, the necessary con-
dition for economic security in terms of overcollat-
eralization is Mt ≥ 0. In the event that (1 +
λi)
∑K
k=1
∑I
i=1 Pci,k,tQci,k,t <
∑K
k=1 dk,t, the reserve asset
12The system level perspective looks at the aggregates of assets and
liabilities; depending on the protocol the ability to use one asset to
cross-subsidize an undercollateralized other asset may be restricted.
13If a protocol does not have this, QΠ,t = 0.
14MKR tokens in the case of Maker.
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Π of a protocol can be used as a lender of last resort to
buy the collateral value. If M < 0 even the liquidation
of all of the primary collateral asset and reserve asset
would be insufficient to cover the total system debt. Since
tt is possible that the collateral and reserve assets are
correlated15, the ability of a reserve asset to recapitalize
a system may be limited in the event of a sharp price
drops. Absent any additional protocol specific defense
mechanisms, this would constitute a catastrophic system
failure since the borrowed funds would become worthless
as they would no longer be redeemable.
The Liquidity Constraint. In an illiquid market, liq-
uidating a collateral asset may only be possible with
a significant haircut, where the collateral is sold at a
discount. Following [36], we define market liquidity as
follows.
Definition IV.3 (Market liquidity). A measure of the
extent to which a market can facilitate the trade of an
asset at short notice, low cost and with little impact on
its price.
The liquidity available in a market implies a security
constraint: in expectations, over a certain time horizon,
DeFi marketplaces can offer enough liquidity that in the
event of a sustained period of negative price shocks, a
protocol will be able to liquidate its collateral quickly
enough to cover its outstanding debt liabilities.
For a time interval [0, T ] this can be expressed as:∫ T
0
E[Ω]dΩ ≤ E[Ωmax] (3)
where Ω denotes the total notional traded value, i.e.,
the (average) price multiplied by the quantity for each
trade. For a given trade ω of size q, ω = p¯q; aggregating
these trades for a total number of trades J provides
Ω =
∑J
j∈J ωj . Ωmax denotes the maximum notional value
that could be sold off during a period of distress in the
financial markets.
In the event of a severe price crash, on the assumption
that a protocol is collateralized to a representative 150%,
we assume a protocol will seize 100% of the debt value from
the collateral pool, and seek to sell this collateral as quickly
as possible on a market pair to the debt asset. Once a buyer
has traded the debt asset d for the collateral, the protocol
could then burn the debt d, effectively taking it out of
circulation, offsetting the liability. Therefore, the impact
that negative price shocks would have on a DeFi lending
protocol, and how quickly they materialize, depend on
liquidity available on all collateral/debt pairs. In the event
of a liquidity crisis, the demand for liquidity outstrips
supply16, such that equation (3) is binding. Indeed, if
15There is evidence that crypto-assets display high intra-class
correlation, limiting the advantage of diversification [26].
16Indeed, such liquidity crises were at the heart of the Financial
crisis of 2007-8, as the value of many financial instruments traded by
banks fell sharply without buyers [1].
equation 3 is binding there are not enough buyers in the
market to buy the ETH that is for sale.
The Counterparty Risk Constraint. DeFi lending
protocols are not fully decentralized on account of, for in-
stance, the possibility of oracle attacks (which could cause
a flash-crash), as well as privileged access to the smart
contracts. Therefore it is necessary to either assume the
“operator” of the protocol is honest, or that the operator
only offers the services of the protocol provided they are
profitable for them. We formally model this counterparty
risk by assuming that its existence in a given protocol
creates a risk premium, ψ, such that for an agent deciding
between earning a return in a DeFi lending protocol vs
elsewhere, the expected return in the DeFi protocol (rD),
once adjusted for the risk premium (ψ), must be higher
than an outside return rf . Formally, we have participation
constraint rD − ψ > rf . This constraint is a participation
constraint, and in Section V we assume that this inequality
holds, such that agents have already chosen to participate
in the protocol.
There exists an inherent trade-off in counterparty risk.
On the one hand, governance mechanisms implemented
through voting allow for a certain degree of decentraliza-
tion whereby multiple protocol participants can influence
the future direction of a protocol. Depending on the
distribution of tokens, this may reduce the risk of one
party becoming malicious. However, it also opens the door
to attacks on the voting system, as we introduced in Sec-
tion III. On the other hand, a single ‘benevolent dictator’
who controls the governance mechanism can prevent the
attacks introduced in Section III. Yet this requires trusting
that this central entity does not lose or expose its private
keys controlling access to the smart contracts governing
the protocol and that this central party cannot be bribed
to behave maliciously.
V. Stress-Testing DeFi Lending
This section considers the financial security of a generic
DeFi lending protocol, stress-testing the architecture to
quantitatively assess its robustness as inspired by central
banks [37], [43].
A. Stress-Testing Framework
Central banks conduct stress tests of banking systems to
test their ability to withstand shocks. For example, in an
annual stress test, the Bank of England examines what the
potential impact would be of an adverse scenario on the
banking system [37]. The hypothetical scenario is a “tail-
risk” scenario, which seeks to be broad and severe enough
to capture a range of adverse shocks. Following such best
practice, we devise and implement a stress-test of the DeFi
architecture.
B. Simulation Approach
We leverage the generic DeFi lending protocol architec-
ture as developed in Section IV-A. We focus on a single
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collateral asset here for tractability, but this analysis can
be extended lending protocols which rely on overcollateral-
ization by multiple volatile collateral assets in combination
with reserve assets. In part reflecting Appendix C Table II,
we make the following assumptions about the initial state
of the system.
1) The lending protocol allows users to deposit ETH as
their single source of collateral ci.
2) The lending protocol has 1m tokens of a generic
reserve asset, which at the start of the simulation has
the same price as ETH but with exactly half of the
historical standard deviation of ETH taken over the
sample period.
3) By arbitrage among borrowers, before the crash the
lending protocol as a whole is collateralized to λi + ,
i.e., just above the minimum collateralization ratio.
4) At the start of the crisis, the protocol has a collater-
alization ratio of exactly 150%, such that every USD
of debt is backed by 1.50 USD of collateral.
5) Each unit of debt dk maintains a peg of 1:1 to the US
dollar, allowing us to abstract from the dynamics of
maintaining the peg.
6) At the start of the sell-off, it is possible to sell 30,000
ETH per day without having an impact on price.17.
7) The amount of reserve asset Π is fixed at the start of
the sell-off at 1m units.
8) System debt levels range from 100m USD to 400m
USD, seeking to approximately reflect the levels of
capital escrowed in DeFi protocols as in Appendix C
Table I.
Next, we detail the methodology we follow to obtain our
simulation results.
Price simulation. Firstly, we obtain OHLCV data
at daily frequency [14], focusing on the period Jan-
uary 1st, 2018 to February 7th, 2020, incorporating the
large fall in the ETH price in early 2018. We present the
evolution of ETH close prices in Appendix D Fig. 8 and
a histogram of log returns in Appendix D Fig. 9. Perhaps
the most notable element is the decline in the ETH/USD
price over the course of 2018, with the price of ETH
falling from an all-time-high of 1,432.88 USD to c. 220
USD as of February 7th, 2020. Taking parameters from
this historical data18, we use Monte Carlo simulation to
capture how the ETH and reserve prices may be expected
to evolve over the next 100 days. Monte Carlo simulation
leverages randomness to produce a range of outcomes of a
stochastic system. We simulate 5,000 randomly generated
paths, using a geometric Brownian motion, specified with
the following equation.
17This assumption is based on the 24-hour volume of ETH/DAI
across markets listed on CoinGecko on February 7th, 2020, and as
such is only a rough proxy for the market liquidity. We use this
figure only as a baseline for parameterization and to highlight the
theoretical possibility of illiquidity causing default.
18For the daily ETH/USD price data we find mean log returns of
0.001592 and standard deviation 0.050581, parameter values which
have been independently verified.
Pci,t = Pci,0 exp
[
(µi − σ
2
i
2
)t+ σiWt
]
(4)
Wt denotes a Wiener process [51] and for collateral type
i µi denotes the drift and σi denotes the volatility.
19 Of
the 5,000 simulations, our subsequent analysis is focused
on the iteration which yields the fastest undercollateraliza-
tion event. By focusing on this worst-case, we test the DeFi
lending protocol with a “black swan” event, representing a
severe challenge to its robustness.
System simulation. We propose a simple model for the
decline in liquidity over time as follows.
L = L0 exp(−ρt) (5)
where L0 denotes the initial amount of ETH that can be
sold per day. Intuitively, this equation captures the notion
that in the event that the protocol attempts to sell large
volumes each period, the amount of liquidity available in
the next period will be lower.
In this simulation approach, we make a simplification
by not modeling the impact that selling large volumes of
collateral will have on the price of the collateral asset. It is
highly likely that in such a sell-off scenario, the selling of
large volumes would serve to endogenously push the price
lower. Therefore what we present here represents an upper
bound on the price behavior: in reality, the price drop may
be even worse than the one we examine.
C. Simulation Results
We start with the Monte Carlo simulation of the cor-
related asset paths, before considering the impact this
would have on a DeFi lending protocol and an ecosystem
of multiple lending protocols.
Monte Carlo Price Simulation. To capture the ef-
fects of different correlations between the collateral asset
and the reserve asset, we consider three different extents
of correlation between the collateral and reserve asset:
(i) strong, positive correlation (0.9), (ii) weak, positive
correlation (0.1) and (iii) strong negative correlation (-
0.9). We then generate correlated asset paths during the
Monte Carlo simulation process. In this section we report
results for strong correlation, but include those for weak
correlation and strong negative correlation in Appendix E.
Fig. 3 shows the results of 5,000 runs of the Monte Carlo
simulator for the ETH price, and Appendix E Fig. 10
shows the results for the reserve asset price in the presence
of strong positive correlation in the asset price returns.
The starting prices of assets as used in the simulator is
the close price of ETH/USD on February 7th, 2020.
19In this estimation, we draw shocks from the normal distribution,
as is standard in GBM. Since performing a Jarque-Bera test [24]
over the sample period suggests that the log-returns are non-normal,
it is possible that in our estimation we underestimate the impact
of heavy tails. Therefore, we present a best-case upper bound; in
practice, undercollateralization could precipitate more quickly.
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Fig. 3: Monte Carlo forecast of ETH prices over the next 100
days from February 7th, 2020.
We isolate the simulation which yields the fastest under-
collateralization event.20 In Appendix E Fig. 11 it is clear
that in this worst case scenario for the ETH/USD price,
the price of the reserve asset similarly falls. This illustrates
the risk of using a reserve asset which is positively corre-
lated with the collateral asset: if the price of the collateral
asset falls, relative to the same basis of value the reserve
asset value is likely to fall, limiting the ability of a DeFi
lending protocol to recapitalize itself.
Impact on Collateral Margin. We take the simulation
yielding the fastest undercollateralization event and con-
sider the impact this would have on the collateral margin
of a DeFi lending protocol. The main results of this are
presented in Fig. 4. Plotted with solid lines is the evolution
of the total collateral margin (comprising the collateral
and the reserve asset) over time as the prices of the
collateral asset and reserve asset decline. The dashed lines
indicate how the amount of system debt evolves through
time, on the assumption that at the start of the 100 day
period, the protocol seeks to sell off all of the debt. The
speed at which the debt can be liquidated through the sale
of its backing collateral in turn depends on the available
liquidity in the market for which we consider 3 cases:
1) constant liquidity (such that it is possible to sell a
constant amount of ETH every day at the average
daily price)
2) mild illiquidity (where the illiquidity parameter is
arbitrarily set to some low level ρ = 0.005)
3) illiquidity, such that ρ = 0.01.
Where the initial system debt level is 100m USD, regard-
less of the liquidity parameter, the collateral margin does
not become negative. However, at higher levels of debt,
we see that the margin gets closer to 0, and once the debt
level reaches 400m USD, the margin does indeed fall below
0, such that the protocol is undercollateralized overall. In
the fourth panel of Fig. 4 we see that after 19 days of the
20We plot the co-evolution of the asset price paths for strong
correlation in Appendix E Fig. 11.
protocol attempting to liquidate as much debt as possible,
due to illiquidity it is unable to liquidate in time and the
margin becomes negative. This would constitute a crisis in
a DeFi protocol: each unit of debt would not have suffi-
cient collateral backing, and rational agents would walk
away from the protocol without repaying their debt.21
Notably, the results presented in the Appendix E show
that a weakly correlated reserve asset is able to slow or
prevent the collateral margin from becoming negative (see
Appendix E Fig. 13) while a strongly negative correlation
between the assets is actually able to bolster the collateral
margin (see Appendix E Fig. 15).
For the case where the collateral and reserve assets are
strongly positively correlated, we consider how quickly a
crisis may materialize for varying starting values of ETH
liquidity and initial debt in Fig. 5. Fig. 5 shows that for a
given amount of debt, the lower the starting liquidity (i.e.,
the amount that can be sold within 24 hours), the faster a
negative margin precipitates. Similarly, for a fixed initial
starting liquidity, the more debt there is in the system the
faster the margin will become negative, down to below 15
days.
VI. Related Work
There is a paucity of directly related work. However,
existing work can be divided into the following categories.
A series of fundamental results in relation to the ability
of non-custodial stablecoins to maintain their peg is pro-
vided in [25]. It is shown that stablecoins face delever-
aging spirals which cause illiquidity during crises, and
that stablecoins have stable and unstable domains. The
model primarily involves the assumption of two types of
agents in the marketplace: the stablecoin holder (who
wants stability), and the speculator (who seeks leverage).
The authors further demonstrate that such systems are
susceptible to tail volatility. While unpublished, [10] uses
option pricing theory to design dual-class structures that
offer fixed income stable coins that are pegged to fiat
currency. Further, [39] considers how one might build an
asset-backed cryptocurrency through the use of hedging
techniques.
VII. Conclusions
This paper has sought to demonstrate that, as they
stand, DeFi lending protocols are liable to a variety of
attack vectors. Firstly, we show the feasibility of an attack
on the governance mechanism of Maker, finding that, prior
to the fix implemented by Maker, provided an attacker was
able to lock 27.5m USD of governance tokens they would
have been able to steal all 0.5bn USD worth of collateral
within two blocks. Therein we presented a novel strategy
21In the event that strong-identities (i.e., where the mapping be-
tween an agent an an online identity is one-to-one and time invariant)
are enforced on-chain, this calculus may change for agents, reducing
the probability of a crisis by increasing the costs to the agent of
reneging on their debt commitments. In this paper we proceed under
the assumption that strong-identities are not enforced.
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A Decentralized Financial Crisis: liquidity and illiquidity causing negative margins
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Fig. 4: A DeFi lending protocol experiencing a sharp decline in the price of its collateral and reserve assets. Panels correspond
to four different levels of system debt, with each panel showing the evolution of the collateral margin (solid lines) and the
total debt outstanding (dashed lines). Each panel also shows the consequences of different liquidity parameters. The margin
becomes negative in panels 3 and 4— entering the red region below zero—the situation in which the lending protocol has become
undercollateralized.
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that would have enabled an attacker to steal the collateral
within two transactions without the need to escrow any
assets.
Secondly, after providing formal constraints on the ro-
bust operation of a DeFi lending protocol, we use simula-
tions to show that a for given parameters a DeFi lending
protocol may become under-collateralized. We describe the
interrelation of market liquidity and outstanding debt,
showing how the larger the debt, or the less liquid a
market, the faster insolvency can occur. We also consider
different levels of correlation between the collateral and
the reserve asset in a DeFi lending protocol and show that
having a reserve asset that is weakly positively correlated
or indeed negatively correlated can help to ensure protocol
solvency.
These two types of failure mode in a DeFi protocol
are potentially mutually reinforcing. If the collateral and
reserve assets of a DeFi lending protocol experience a
sharp decline in price, the cost of acquiring enough gover-
nance tokens to undertake the governance attack would
also likely fall. Conversely, should an actor undertake
a governance attack, this would plausibly send shock
waves throughout the DeFi ecosystem, serving to reduce
the price of the collateral asset, in turn making under-
collateralization more likely.
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Appendix
A. Existing DeFi protocols
Project Capital (USD) Blockchain
Lending Maker [20] 342.9m Ethereum
Compound [19] 91.6m Ethereum
Aave [3] 36.4m Ethereum
DEX Uniswap [48] 35.7m Ethereum
Bancor [7] 7.2m Ethereum
Kyber [27] 3.9m Ethereum
Derivatives Synthetix [45] 101.9m Ethereum
Nexus [33] 2.7m Ethereum
Erasure [18] 1.2m Ethereum
Payments Lightning [35] 6.5m Bitcoin
Connext [13] 12.1k Ethereum
Assets token Sets [47] 9m Ethereum
WBTC [49] 7.3m Ethereum
Melon [30] 221.9k Ethereum
TABLE I: Existing DeFi projects [41] (April 15th, 2020).
B. Governance Attack on Maker
Fig. 6: Twitter poll for of a crowdfunding attack on MKR
governance.
30 01
Feb
2020
0831 02 03 04 05 06 07
Date
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Am
ou
nt
 o
f M
KR
 to
ke
ns
Fig. 7: Daily traded volume of MKR tokens between 2020-01-30
and 2020-02-08.
C. Parameters of DeFi lending platforms
Protocol Collateral asset Reserve
(liquidation ratio) asset
Maker [20] ETH (150%), BAT (150%), USDC (125%) MKR
Compound [19] ETH (133%), BAT (167%), DAI (133%)
REP (250%), USDC (133%), ZRX (167%)
Aave [3] DAI (125%), USDC (125%), TUSD (125%)
ETH (125%), LEND (154%), BAT (154%)
KNC (154%), LINK (143%), MANA (154%)
MKR (154%), REP (154%), WBTC (154%)
ZRX (154%)
dYdX [16] ETH (115%), USDC (115%), DAI (115%)
TABLE II: Parameters of DeFi lending platforms, comprising
93% of DeFi market as of April 15th, 2020.
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E. Simulation results
Fig. 10: Monte Carlo forecast of the reserve asset price over the
next 100 days from February 7th, 2020.
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Fig. 11: For the simulation yielding the fastest undercollateral-
ization event, the co-evolution of the ETH and reserve asset
prices where the asset price returns are strongly positively
correlated.
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Fig. 12: For the simulation yielding the fastest undercollateralization event, the co-evolution of the ETH and reserve asset prices
where the asset price returns are weakly positively correlated.
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A Decentralized Financial Crisis: liquidity and illiquidity causing negative margins
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Fig. 13: A DeFi lending protocol experiencing a sharp decline in the price of its collateral and reserve assets, where the assets
have a correlation of 0.1. Panels correspond to 4 different levels of system debt, with each panel showing the evolution of the
collateral margin and the total debt outstanding. Each panel also shows the consequences of different liquidity parameters.
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Fig. 14: For the simulation yielding the fastest undercollateralization event, the co-evolution of the ETH and reserve asset prices
where the asset price returns are strongly negatively correlated.
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A Decentralized Financial Crisis: liquidity and illiquidity causing negative margins
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Fig. 15: A DeFi lending protocol experiencing a sharp decline in the price of its collateral asset with a negatively correlated
reserve asset, where the assets have a correlation of -0.9. Panels correspond to 4 different levels of system debt, with each panel
showing the evolution of the collateral margin and the total debt outstanding. Each panel also shows the consequences of different
liquidity parameters.
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